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The Federal Quarantine and Global Migration Network: A National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine Report
Lawrence O. Gostin, JD, Georges C. Benjamin, MD, Tequam Worku, MPH
The COVID-19 pandemic thrust the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s
(CDC) Division of Global Migration and Quarantine (DGMQ) into the epicenter of the national
response. DGMQ is charged with preventing the importation of infectious disease at land and sea
borders and its spread within the country. For more than 50 years, DGMQ’s comprehensive

quarantine system, its regulatory powers, and scientific guidance has placed DGMQ on the
forefront of emergency response.1 CDC requested the National Academy of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) to assess DGMQ’s performance during the COVID-19
pandemic,2 covering 5 key areas.
Organizational Capacity
An agency’s ability to fulfill its mission requires organizational capacity: infrastructure,
finances, workforce, and culture.3 DGMQ’s infrastructure is comprised primarily of a complex

quarantine station network, which monitors and responds to sick travelers and high-risk cargo
(dogs, human tissue, monkeys, and other non-human primates) moving through ports of entry
(see e-Figure). The NASEM Committee recommended that DGMQ reassess its quarantine
station network model, determining if quarantine stations should be added, deleted, or upgraded.
DGMQ should also enhance post-entry partnerships with local, state, and federal agencies,
sharing resources and responsibilities using modern technology. Finally, the maritime unit
should be moved within DGMQ to address the unique needs of cruise ships and other maritime
vessels.

DGMQ’s core funding has remained stagnate over the past decade, even as the agency
has faced growing frequency and complexity of infectious disease threats, including MERS,
Zika, Ebola, Influenza H1N1, and COVID-19. The committee found that DGMQ’s budget is
incommensurate with its core responsibilities. The division has an urgent need for reliable
funding streams beyond routine appropriations and intermittent surge funding. CDC should
reevaluate DGMQ’s financial and personnel resources to better respond to COVID-19 and future
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health emergencies. One innovative model would be to require user fees to ensure the division
has a consistent and dependable revenue source.
Faced with unpredictable funding, the division has struggled with personnel recruitment,
retention, skills development, vacancy rates, and burnout. DGMQ has had to rely on contract and
temporary staff to fill gaps. The committee recommended DGMQ develop a comprehensive plan
for a diverse and well-trained workforce. Recruiting well qualified staff requires new strategies,
including engaging academic institutions to develop a pipeline of future employees. A “Ready
Reserve Corps” could give the division surge capacity in responding to unanticipated health
emergencies. DGMQ should also assess its organizational culture, so its values support the
mission. CDC’s Director is appropriately focusing on achieving diversity and inclusion to reduce
health inequities. DGMQ should enhance its workforce and activities in line with this goal.
Disease Control and Prevention
The rapid spread, morbidity, and emergence of SARS-CoV-2 variants demonstrated the
need for more effective disease control and prevention tools. During the pandemic, DGMQ has
had to operate without critical evidence, which undermined its effectiveness. Traditional testing,
contact tracing, isolation, and quarantine failed to significantly curb introduction and spread of
SARS-CoV-2. Interventions such as border closings and travel restrictions were not consistent
with WHO recommendations under the International Health Regulations.4 While evidence of the
impact of travel restrictions is incomplete, the available data shows they are most effective if
implemented early and combined with community mitigation strategies.5 The committee
recommended CDC conduct an external formal evaluation or modeling studies on the
effectiveness of travel restrictions and active screening and monitoring of international travelers.
A more robust research agenda would better inform DGMQ, undergirded by scientific evidence.
Planning for, and simulations of, infectious disease outbreaks have been inconsistent,
while planning for a pandemic of the magnitude of COVID-19 was virtually non-existent. The
committee recommended detailed operational plans and playbooks based on high-risk scenarios,
across multiple agencies. Enhanced coordination with state, local and tribal partners, as well as
academia and the private sector, is critically important.
Technologies and Data Systems
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The COVID-19 pandemic revealed gaps in global health systems’ capacity to detect and
respond to emerging threats in a timely manner, underscoring the need to improve early warning
systems.6 Nationally, the pandemic shed light on flaws in CDC’s data systems for disease
surveillance and mitigation, including innovative technologies for genomic and wastewater
monitoring. Better data would facilitate understanding the effectiveness of key interventions such
as masks, ventilation, and social distancing. Interoperability across data systems would also
improve the rapid exchange of timely data.7 In collecting and using data, the committee
recommended DGMQ should be attentive to legal and ethical concerns about equity and
privacy—especially when deploying novel and powerful digital technologies, including location
tracking.
The committee recommended DGMQ develop and use innovative technologies to aid in
outbreak detection and response. These technologies should facilitate gathering travelers’ health
data, trace transmission, and alert travelers to exposures. DGMQ should support adoption of the
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information (ONC) roadmap by health care and
public health practitioners, and facilitate ONC’s roadmap and interoperability networks.

Collaboration in a Federalist Public Health System
The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the broad range of partners with which DGMQ must
engage to effectively execute its responsibilities, including federal interagency partners, and
state, tribal, local, and territorial agencies. The division must also coordinate effectively with the
private sector and international partners. The Immigrant, Refugee, and Migrant Health (IRMH)
Branch within DGMQ partners with international entities and non-governmental entities
including the World Health Organization, the International Organization of Migration, and
governments.8 Fostering trust and strengthening DGMQ’s functional working relationships are

critical to effectively respond to infectious disease threats. The committee recommended DGMQ
strengthen partnerships through defined and planned activities that enhance working
relationships and build trust. It should also modernize health communication for travelers to
improve public understanding of disease prevention and control as well as compliance.
Legal Authorities, Powers, and Limits
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the urgent need to modernize public health legal
authorities. DGMQ regulates pursuant to the Public Health Service Act of 1944,9 which predated
3

the age of large-scale travel, mass migration, changing land-use patterns, encroachment on
animal habitats, and climate change—all drivers of rapid disease spread. The 1944 Act is so
outdated and vague that the judiciary delayed or blocked many federal executive measures
designed to curb SARS-CoV-2 transmission, including CDC’s housing eviction moratorium,
transit mask mandate, and expulsion of migrants at the southern border (Title 42).
While recognizing the political context, the committee urged Congress to modernize the
Public Health Service Act to provide CDC adequate legal authority and flexibility to respond to

public health threats. This requires broader and more flexible delegations of public health
authority to reflect what CDC needs to carry out its mission through evidence-based measures.
CDC should be empowered to implement science-based public health measures to mitigate
disease spread which states could not achieve acting on their own. Critically, it includes ample
authority to prevent the introduction and interstate spread of infectious diseases. Congress should
also ensure that CDC’s exercise of power is the least restrictive alternative to achieve its public
health mission, while protecting individual rights and freedoms. Individuals should have due
process of law when challenging CDC orders. Congress should also ensure that CDC exercises
its powers fairly and equitably.
The COVID-19 pandemic posed major challenges to CDC. DGMQ has been at the front
lines, acting at the nation’s land and sea borders and on interstate carriers. The division had to
implement novel tools and intervene at an unprecedented scale. Yet it lacked modern data
systems, a well-trained workforce capable of surge capacity, adequate funding, and strong legal
powers. It often had to operate in the absence of full scientific information. Going forward,
DGMQ will face novel challenges, as the pace and scope of emerging and reemerging diseases
accelerate. The NASEM report offers a roadmap to build capacities to better identify and control

COVID-19 and future health emergencies.

Disclaimer: The authors are responsible for the content of this article, which does not necessarily
represent the views of NASEM.
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